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RECENT CASES 185
A second rule. enunciated is that the validity of contracts is governed by
the law the parties intended to govern.2 2 Under the third rule, the law of
the state contemplated as the place of perfornmiance governs. 23 In the instant
case it is arguable that the parties intended to be governed by the law of
the state where the insured contracted liability. Application of either of the
latter two rules might require a result different from that reached by this
court. However, the opinion rendered appears sound on principle. The rule
most generally accepted governs contracts according to the law of the place
where they are entered. This nile has the additional merits of simplicity and
certainty in most cases.
2 4
ROBERT H. LUNDBERG
INTERNAL REVENUE - DEPRECIATION - RIGHTS OF LIFE TENANTS TO
)EPRECIATE IMPROVEMENTS. - Petitioner and her husband entered into a
trust agreement whereby certain real property was conveyed as a gift in
trust to a daughter, subject to a life estate in themselves and the survivor.
Subsequently, after the death of her husband and at the age of 73, the
petitioner razed an unproductive building on the property and built a new
office building so that she might profit from her life estate. The useful life of
the building was 50 years and her life expectancy was then 7.26 years. Peti-
tioner claimed a deduction for depreciation based on her life expectancy in
her income tax returns. The Court of Appeals held that depreciation was to
be computed over the life of the property and not over the life expectancy
of the tenant for life, Penn v. Commissioner of Internal Reventw, 199 F.2d
210 (8th Cir. 1952).
Depreciation, a matter of legislative grace,' is allowed as a deduction
from gross income in determining the net taxable income.2 The allowance
applies only to property used in the trade or business of the taxpayer pro-
vided he has supplied the capital which has gone into the property. 3 A de-
22, This view has been reiected by text writers. 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws 1079
(1935); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 325 (3rd ed. 1949); and by the courts, New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Cravens 178 U.S. 389 (1900); Ragsdale v. Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen, 229 Mo. App. 545, 80 S.W.2d 272 (1934).
23. See 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws 1086 (1935); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws
324 (3rd ed., 1949).
24. See 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws 1090 (1935); see Note 16 A.L.R.2d 881, 890
(1951).
1. See Sunray Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 962, 965 (10th Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 861 (1945); Detroit Edison Co. %,. Commissioner, 131 F.2d
619, 622 (6th Cir. 1942), aff'd, 319 U.S. 98 (1943) "Like all other deductions. the
allowance is a matter of legislative grace."
2. Int. Rev. Code §23 (1): "In computing net income there shall be allowed as
deductions:
(1) Depreciation.-A reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear
(including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence)-
(1) of property used in the trade or business, or
(2) of property held for the production of income."
3. City Nat. Bank Bldg. Co. v. Helvering, 98 F.2d 216, 219 (D.C. App. 1938),
"The test is, can the cleimant, whatever his relationship to the property - as owner,
lessee, lessor, etc., - show a depreciating capital investment? The purpose of the
depreciation allowance is to permit a person whose money is invested to recover through
annual deduction an amount equal to the original outlay." See Weiss v. Weiner,
279 U.S. 333 (1929) (99 year lessee not permited to depreciate lessor's property);
see Century Electric .Co,, 15 T.C. 581, 585 (1950); Gladling Dry Goods Co., 2
B.T.A. 336, 338 (1925) (the important question is who made the investment to he
recovered over the period of depreciation).
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duction is allowable to a taxpayer if he is an owner 4 or a lessee 5 but in
either case it is fundamental that there must be a present loss of invested
capital." Courts allow a purchaser of a life tenancy to depreciate the pur-
chase price over his life expectancy. 7 Lessees may depreciate improvements
made by them over the life of the lease or over the life of the improvement,
whichever is shorter.8 While it is true that a lease is not a freehold interest
in land,9 yet the improvement is lost to the lessee when the lease expires.10
In the instant case, the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Board
of Tax Appeals in Caroline T. Kissell.'1 in which it was held that a building
erected by a life tenant could be depreciated over the life tenant's life ex-
pectancy since it could be considered a purchase of a life estate because paid
for out of the life tenant's own funds. The court rejected the idea that the
Kissell case was controlling because the Revenue Act of 1921,12 which was
applicable in that case, provided for a reasonable allowance for the wear and
tear of property used in trade or business. As construed by the court, the
statute applicable in the present case provides that where property is held by
a life tenant with remainder to another person, the deduction is to be com-
puted over the useful life of the property. 13
Petitioner further contended that the statute was intended to apply solely
to improvements on the property at the time of the creation of the life ten-
ancy and not to cases where the improvements are placed on the property at
the expense of the life tenant after the estate has vested. The Court of Ap-
peals answered this contention by saying that "no such restriction can be
found in the statute, in its legislative history, or in the Treasury Regulations
applicable." 14 It seems doubtful that this is so; in fact, a survey of the his-
tory of the statute, which ought to be a persuasive if not decisive factor in
4. See note 3 supra.
5. 353 Lexington Avenue Corp., 27 1l.T.A. 762 (1933) (lessee who built on
leased premises allowed to depreciate building over life of lease); Duffy v. Central
Rly., 268 U.S. 55 (1925) (lessee could depreciate improvements financed by him
over life of lease). But ef. Standard Tube Co., T.C. 950 (1946) (since lease is for
indefinite period, lessee must depreciate permanent improvements made by him over
useful life).
6. See note 3 supra.
7. Floyd M. Schoemaker, 16 B.T.A. 1145 (1929) (purchaser of a life estate
allowed to deduct annuity payment as depreciation); ElMCr J. Keitel, 15 B.T.A. 90:3
(1929) (court held that the purcha;er of life interest held a capital investment which
should be depreciated over the life expectancy of the tenant per autre vie).
S. Duffy v. Central Ry., 26S U.S. 55 (1925) (lessee allowed to depreciate
improvements financed by him over life of lease on first lease and over the life of
the improvement on second lease),
9. See Insurance Co., v. Haven, 95 U.S. 242, 250 (1877) (leases for years are
chattel interests, not freeholds); Burdick, Real Property 24 (1914).
10. Burdick, Real Property 25 (1914); Tiffany, Real Property 410 (1940).
11. 15 B.T.A. 705 (1929); Cf. Grant v. Rose, 32 F.2d 812 (N.D. Ga. 1929)
aff'd, 39 F.2d 33R (5th Cir. 1930) cert. denied, 238 U.S. 867 (1931) (life tenant
allowed to depreciate improvements which he purchased over his life tenancy).
12. 42 Stat. 240 (1923): "Sec. 214 (a). That in computing net income there
shall he allowed as deductions:
(8) A reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear of property
used in the trade or business, including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence."
13. Int. Rev. Code §23 (1) provides that "in the case of property held by
one person for life with remainder to another person, the deduction shall be computed
as if the life tenant were the absolute owner of the property and shall he allowed
to the life tenant." The court said in the instant case that the rule of depreciation
applicable to absolute owners was applicable to the life tenant, i.e., that depreciation
wias to be computed on the basis of the useful life of the property.
14. Penn. v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 210, 212 (8th Cir. 1952).
RECENT CASES
construing it,15 indicates that precisely the opposite inference may be drawn.
In carrying out the mandate of the Revenue Act of 1921, that a "reason-
able" amount was to be allowed as a deduction for depreciation, the courts
had developed the following rule: The life expectancy of the tenant for life
was first divided by the useful life of the property. The value of the im-
provement,.was then multiplied by the result of the foregoing computation,
the figure arrived at by this means being the present value of the life ten-
ant's estate. This computation may be expressed as follows:
life expectancy of life tenant
----- ---- ------ ----- .- . .. .. .. ..-- - - - -- - -- - - - X v a l u e o f im p r o v e m e n t = p r e s e n t v a l u e o f
useful life of property tenant's estate.
Once the present value of the tenant's estate for life is ascertained, it was
then divided by the life expectancy of the tenant for life, the result being the
annual deduction for depreciation allowed the life tenant.1, But the courts
had held that the rule of apportionment under the Revenue Act of 1921 ap-
plied only to improved property coming into the hands of a life tenant.1 7
Improvements made at the expense of the life tenant were depreciated on
the basis of his life expectancy.' s Congress incorporated the rule of apportion-
ment as stated by the courts into the Revenue Act of 1926,19 which stated
that in the case of improved real estate held by a life tenant, the deduction
was to be equitably apportioned between the life tenant and the remainder-
man. Thereafter, in an effort to clarify the statute and reduce hardship and un-
certainty to life tenants, 2 0 Congress provided in the Revenue Act of 192821
that where property was held by a life tenant, the deduction was to be com-
puted over the useful life of the improvement. It should be noted that the
amount of the deduction computed by the rule of apportionment under the
earlier Revenue Acts and under the Revenue Act of 1928 are necessarily the
same where the improvements are not erected by the life tenant since the
15. Baldwin v. Bowles, 57 F. Supp. 637 (W.D.S.C. 1944); see Helvering v.
Morgan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 126 (1934) "But the true meaning of a single section
of a statute in a setting as complex as that of the revenue acts, however precise its
language, cannot be ascertained if it be considered apart from related sections, or
if the mind be isolated from the history of income tax legislation . . ."; Helvering v.
N.Y. Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455, 464 (1934); Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216, 234 (1931)
16. H. C. Brown, 25 B.T.A. 631 (1932) (depreciation equitably apportioned
between tenants per autre vie and remainderman); Rose v. Grant, 39 F.2d 338 (5th
Cir. 1930), cent. dismissed, 283 U.S. 867 (1931) (depreciation of office building
was fairly apportioned between the life tenant and the remainderman); cf. 9 B.U.L.
Rev. 288 (1929).
17. Grant v. Rose 32 F.2d 812 (N.D. Ga. 1929), aff'd 39 F.2d 338 (5th Cir.
1930) cert. denied, 283 U.S. 867 (1931).
18. Caroline T. Kissel, 15 B.T.A. 705 (1929) (life tenant allowed to depre-
ciate improvements made at his expense); Grant v. Rose, 32 F.2d 812 (N.D. Ga. 1929),
aff'd, 39 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1930), cert. denied,. 283 .. S. 867 (1931).
19. 44 Stat. 26 (1926). "See. 214 (a). In computing net income there shall
be allowed as deductions:
(8) a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear of property
used in the trade or business. . . . In the case of improved real estate held by one
person for life with remainder to another person, the deduction provided for under
this paragraph shall be equitably apportioned between the life tenant and the remain-
derman ...." (emphasis supplied).
20. I.R.B. 16, 1939-1 Cum. Bull. 422.
21. 45 Stat. 800 (1928). "Depreciation .... In the case of property held by
one person for life with remainder to another person, the deduction shall be computed
as if the life tenant were the absolute owner of the property and shall be allowed
to the life tenant." It should be noted that this provision is the provision presently
appearing in the Internal Revenue Code. Int. Rev. Code §23 (1).
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basis for computing depreciation under both rules is the useful life of the
property.22 A tenable argument apparently not presented by the petitioner
is that Congress in the Revenue Act of 1928, did not intend to change the
law as to depreciation in the case of life tenants but only to introduce a simple
and concise rule for computing depreciation, thereby eliminating the con-
fusion produced by the rule of apportionment. Therefore, since improve-
ments made by the life tenant were excepted under the Revenue Act of
1921,23 they should also be excepted under the Revenue Act of 1928 and
thus under the present provision, which is a carry-over of the 1928 legis-
lation.
Clearly, the petitioner in this case was the victim of an unfortunate de-
cision. The fact that the cost was recovered within the first five years of the
building's use rebuts any presumption that a gift to the daughter was intend-
ed.24 But on the death of the petitioner her estate will be unable to recover
the undepreciated cost of the building from the remainderman because it is
well settled that a life tenant cannot burden the estate of the remainderman
with the cost of improvements even if they enhance the value of the prop-
erty. 25 The result reached by the court may therefore be criticized on the
ground that it discourages legitimate business enterprises and forces life
tenants to allow valuable business property to fall into ruin because of natural
wear and tear, obsolescence, and changing conditions. Appropriate legis-
lation to allow life tenants to depreciate improvements financed by them over
their life expectancies would appear to be distinctly desirable.
JOHN G. MUrsciEat
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - IGNORANCE OF EXISTENCE OF THE CAUSE OF
ACTION - STATUTE BARRED UNDISCOVERED CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MAL-
PRACTICE, - The defendant performed an operation upon the plaintiff on
December 8, 1942, and negligently failed to remove a surgical sponge from
22. By applying the rule of apportionment used under the 1921 act to a hypo-
thetical case where the life expectancy of the life tenant is 10 years, the useful life of
the property is 20 years, and the present value of the property is $20,000, the follow-
ing result is reached:
10/20 x $20,000 = $10,000 - 10 - $1000 annual depreciation.
Applying the rule of the present act to the same case, the same result is reached:
$20,000 - 20 = $1000 annual depreciation.
The similarity in results illustrates the fact that the present act is merely a
codification of the judicially-developed rule of apportionment applied to improved
property under the Revenue Act of 1921.
23. See note 19 supra.
24. The building was erected in 1938 at a cost of approximately $17,000. The
petitioner received from $4,000 to $5,000 per year rental from 1938 to 1943. From
1943 to 1950 she received $68,604. Considering the improvement from a business
standpoint, it represented a prudent investment for her own account. Cf. Caroline T.
Kissel, 15 B.T.A. 705, 706 (1929): "Since petitioner is deriving rentals from the
building, it follows that she is using the building in her business."
25. E.g., Dickey v. Stevens, 208 Ark. 111, 184 S.W.2d 955 (1945) (grantor who
retained life estate not allowed to charge the remainderman for improvements); Belfield
v. Findlay, 389 I1. 526, 60 N.E.2d 403 (1945) (improvements are deemed to have been
made for the benefit of the life tenant); Caldwell v. Jacob, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 21, 24, 22
S.W. 436, 437 (1893), modified on rehearing, 24 S.W. 86 (1894) (court gave two
reasons why improvements cannot be made a charge upon the estate of the remainder-
man: 1) To prevent the life tenant's consuming the remainderman's interest by making
improvements the remainderman does not desire or cannot pay for; 2) Improvements
are made for the life tenant's benefit, and usually without reference to the remainder-
man's wishes.). But ci. In re Whitney, 75 Misc 610, 136 N.Y.S. 633 (1912) (lift
tenant allowed compensation for improvements).
